Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Bruce G. Parry and Mansour, INC. v. Okada
Hardware Company, LTD., Hirota Tekko, K.K. :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
H. James Clegg; Stephen J. Hill; Ryan E. Tibbitts; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Gregory J.
Sanders; Hinz J. Mahler; Kipp & Christian; Attorneys for Respondent.
Gary D. Stott; Robert G. Gilchrist; Attorneys for Appellant Mansour; Daniel Darger; Mary Ellen
Sloan; Attorneys for Appellant Perry.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Mansour v. Okada Hardware Company, No. 860278.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1171

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

JTAH
DOCUMENT
<FU
,S9
POCKEINOJ

UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIEfi

$U>-2J^S

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE G. PARRY and MANSOUR,
INC.,
Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 860278

OKADA HARDWARE COMPANY, LTD.,
a foreign corporation, and
HIROTA TEKKO, K.K., a foreign
corporation,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT HIROTA TEKKO, K.K.
Appeal From Order Of The Second Judicial District Court
Of Davis County, Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge

GARY D. STOTT
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Appellant Mansour
DANIEL DARGER
32 Exchange Place, # 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant Parry
MARY ELLEN SLOAN
9 Exchange Place, # 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant Parry

H. JAMES CLEGG
STEPHEN J. HILL
RYAN E. TIBBITTS
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Respondent
Hirota Tekko, K.K.
GREGORY J. SANDERS
HEINZ J. MAHLER
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
32 Exchange Place
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent Okada
Hardware Company, Ltd." 3 I

ED

N0V1T1986

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE G. PARRY and MANSOUR,
INC. ,
Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 860278

OKADA HARDWARE COMPANY, LTD.,
a foreign corporation, and
HIROTA TEKKO, K.K., a foreign
corporation,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT HIROTA TEKKO, K.K.
Appeal From Order Of The Second Judicial District Court
Of Davis County, Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge

GARY D. STOTT
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Appellant Mansour
DANIEL DARGER
32 Exchange Place, # 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant Parry
MARY ELLEN SLOAN
9 Exchange Place, # 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant Parry

H. JAMES CLEGG
STEPHEN J. HILL
RYAN E. TIBBITTS
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Respondent
Hirota Tekko, K.K.
GREGORY J. SANDERS
HEINZ J. MAHLER
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
32 Exchange Place
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent Okada
Hardware Company, Ltd.

PARTIES
Plaintiff Bruce Parry
Defendant Ernst Home Center Corporation
Defendant Pay N* Save
Defendant Pacific Marine Schwabacher
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Mansour, Inc. d/b/a
West Coast Mercantile Co. a/k/a WECO (hereinafter "Mansour")
Defendant and Third-Party Defendant Okada Hardware, Ltd.
(hereinafter "Okada")
Defendant and Third-Party Defendant Hirota Tekko, K.K.
(hereinafter "Hirota Tekko" or "Hirota")

(i)

TABU

OF C >V
P

TABLE OE AUTHORITIES

(

ST A TEMENT OF ' ISSl IES PRESENTED 01 I ' ' I'PK : I.. . .' .'.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
si: JMMAR^ ::: i:;

i RGI IMEI i r

. . . •
.

.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL Of HIROTA TEKKO
il? : -I I LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD
BE P. E F IRMEE
1 , 0 k a d a H a r d w a r e A n d HI r G' t a T e k k o
I ack Sufficient Minimun Contacts
"1/ IIth The State Of Utah To Subject
Them. To The Jurisdiction Of Utah
Courts
' rhe I letter Sent To Man sour '" s
Counsel By Masakazu Hirota,
President Of Hirota Tekko,
Was Not: An Answer To The Third-Party
Complaint And Therefore Did Not
Waive H i r o t a's Defense 0f L a ck 0f
Personal Jurisdictioi I
CONCLUSIC I J

(ii)

. .' '. . .

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21
Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968)

12

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105
S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d
65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970)
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Philadelphia
Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied,
U.S.
, 106 S. Ct. 853 (1986) . . . .

8
9, 10
11, 13

4, 5, 6

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2
L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958)

3, 7

International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)

3

Rio Del Mar Country Club v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. App.
2d 214, 190 P.2d 295 (1948)

11

Sharp v. Sharp, 196 Kan. 38, 409 P.2d 1019 (Kan. 1966) . .

11

Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d
1106 (Utah 1985)
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980)

4
3, 6

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(3) (1953, as amended)

1

Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h)

(iii)

1

5 Am. J.'
.

' Appearance §F *

.£. .-.ppearances 5

*fl (19 62)
. . ..

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Does Hirota Tekko, a Japanese manufacturer, have

sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah for the Utah
state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over it, when
Hirota Tekko•s sole contact with the State of Utah is that its
product allegedly caused injury within the State?
2.

Did Hirota Tekko waive its defense that the Utah state

courts lack personal jurisdiction over it by sending a handwritten letter to third-party plaintiff Mansour's counsel which
disclaims any responsibility for plaintiff's alleged injuries?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 78-27-24(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) (set
forth in Briefs of Appellants and Respondent Okada).
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (set forth
in Brief of Appellant).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case is adequately stated in the briefs of appellants
and respondent Okada.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hirota Tekko had insufficient contacts with the State of
Utah for the courts of this state to constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over it with regard to the plaintiff's

claim.

There was no purposeful direct contact between Hirota

Tekko and the State of Utah.
Hirota Tekko did not waive its personal jurisdiction
defense by its letter to third-party plaintiff Mansour's
counsel disclaiming liability.

Under a prior holding of this

Court, the letter did not constitute an answer or a general
appearance and therefore cannot be construed as a waiver of
defenses.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF HIROTA TEKKO
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
By its ruling of February 25, 1986, as affirmed by its
ruling of April 17, 1986, and as amended by its order of May 5,
1986, the trial court dismissed Okada and Hirota Tekko from the
instant action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Hirota Tekko

submits that the trial court was correct in its dismissal of
Okada and Hirota for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The trial

court's ruling should be affirmed.
1.

Okada Hardware And Hirota Tekko Lack Sufficient
Minimum Contacts With The State Of Utah To Subject
Them To The Jurisdiction Of Utah Courts.

Mansour and Okada have adequately set forth the general
framework within which an jin personam jurisdiction inquiry is
to be made, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court
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in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958), World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62
L. Ed. 490 (1980), and their progeny.

For the sake of brevity,

that framework will not be restated or belabored here.
Because Hirota Tekko is one step further removed from Okada
in the distribution system and other occurrences which ultimately placed the chopping maul, which allegedly caused the
injury complained of, in the State of Utah, Okada's arguments
in support of the trial court's ruling on appeal here are at
least as compelling with regard to Hirota Tekko as Okada and
are adopted herein by this reference.
Hirota allegedly manufactured the chopping maul but did not
export the product to the United States.

There is no evidence

that either Okada or Hirota sold or advertised any products in
the State of Utah.

R. 396.

This court recently stated the test for determining whether
sufficient minimum contacts exist for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction as follows:
In order to determine whether the exercise of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, this Court has recognized that "the central
concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction is
the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, to each other." The assessment of that
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relationship involves determining whether the defendant has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws," It must also be determined "[w]hether the
cause of action arises out of or has a substantial
connection with the activity; and . . . [there must be
a] balancing of the convenience of the parties and the
interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction."
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110
(Utah 1985) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Philadelphia
Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied,
U.S.

, 106 S. Ct. 853 (1986), also discussed by Okada in its

brief, is helpful in determining whether a nonresident defendant has sufficiently "purposely availed" itself of the privilege of conducting activities within a forum state to be
subject to that particular forum's jurisdiction.

In that case,

Philadelphia Resins Corporation (hereinafter "PRC"), a Pennsylvania corporation, was sued in tort, in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah by the insurer of a
geophysical exploration company, Compagnie Generale de
Geophysigne (hereinafter "CGG").

CGG, which was conducting

seismic operations in Utah, contracted with one Randall Rogers,
a helicopter pilot from Arkansas, to fly equipment and personnel to and from testing sites in the field.
Prior to leaving for Utah, Rogers contacted PRC and ordered
three synthetic fiber cables for use in suspending loads from
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helicopters.

Rogers contacted PRC after seeing an advertise-

ment for the cables in a trade magazine.

Rogers told PRC that

the cables were to be used in the Rocky Mountain region, but no
particular state was mentioned.

PRC shipped the cables to

Rogers in Arkansas and Rogers brought them to Utah where they
failed, causing damage to CGG.

I_d. at 441, 442.

In finding the district court lacked jin personam jurisdiction over PRC, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found,
M

[t]here is no evidence that PRC advertises by any method

specifically directed at the Utah market, nor is there any
evidence that PRC employs any personnel in Utah."

I_d. at 443.

The court then noted:
The sum total, then, of PRC's contacts in Utah are:
(1) a miniscule number of sales of products other than
"Phillystran" cable, (2) advertising in a national
trade magazine that presumably reaches Utah, and (3)
the failure of one of its defective "Phillystran"
cables in Utah after the cable was taken there by one
of its customers.
Id.
The court concluded:
Although PRC•s employee may have known that the cable
was destined for use in the Rocky Mountain region,
which includes Utah, it was never specifically foreseeable by PRC that its product was destined for the
Utah market. PRC' s relationship to the Utah market is
simply too attenuated to support jLri personam jurisdiction under the "stream of commerce" theory . . .
* * *
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In this case, the only contact that PRC has with Utah
which is related to the cause of action is the fact
that a PRC product happened to fail and cause damage
in the State. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court made it
clear that a seller of chattels does not, in effect,
"appoint the chattel his agent for service of process." PRC's knowledge of the mere possibility that
its product might be taken into a region of the
country in which Utah is located is not sufficient, in
our view, to make a difference in this regard.
* * *

We hold that PRC•s contacts with the state of
Utah, as shown by the record, are insufficient to
support the exercise of _in personam jurisdiction over
PRC in accordance with the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 446, 447 (citations omitted).
The record in the case at bar indicates Hirota Tekko had
only one of the three contacts with the State of Utah identified by the court in Philadelphia Resins, namely the presence
of its product within the state.

There is no evidence in the

record that Hirota Tekko sold or advertised any of its products
within the state.

R. 396.

The evidence indicates that the

presence in Utah of the product in question, a maul, is
entirely fortuitous.

One Linda Thayne purchased the maul in

Idaho as a Christmas present for her father, a Utah resident.
There is no evidence that Hirota Tekko had anything to do with
the maul finding its way into Utah.

Thus, the purposeful

availment needed for the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
lacking.
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Appellants state:
The Japanese argument that the Utah courts do not
have jurisdiction over them because this product was
sold in Idaho is not logical. If this were true, then
all manufacturers who sell products in Utah can only
be responsible if the specific product in question is
purchased in Utah. In today's marketplace, manufacturers such as Toyota, Datsun, and in this case,
Hirota Tekko, serve to profit from the sale of their
products in Utah. Therefore, they should subject
themselves to the Utah court's jurisdiction no matter
where the specific defective product that causes the
problem may have been purchased.
Brief of Appellants, pp. 14, 15.
Appellants* argument is specious because while Toyota and
Datsun engage in substantial advertising and sales within the
State of Utah, there is no evidence Hirota sold or advertised
any products or had any other contacts with Utah.

The consti-

tutional touchstone - minimum contacts - is the same for
Toyota, Datsun, Okada Hardware and Hirota Tekko.

Such minimum

contacts do not exist with regard to Okada or Hirota Tekko.
As was stated in Hanson v. Denckla:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State. The application of that rule will vary with
the quality and nature of the defendant's activity,
but it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
357 U.S. at 253.
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In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct.
2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985), the Supreme Court stated:
This "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely
as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated"
contracts, or of the "unilateral activity of another
party or a third person." Jurisdiction is proper,
however, where the contracts proximately result from
actions by the defendant himself that create a "substantial connection" with the forum state.
105 S. Ct. at 2183
In this case Hirota had one contact with the State of Utah;
a product manufactured by it allegedly caused injury to a third
person in Utah after a somewhat complicated set of transfers, a
gift and a bailment.

Appellants seem to be urging this court

to reject the traditional "minimum contacts" inquiry and simply
hold that a person or entity can be haled into a court anywhere
in the world where one of their products causes damage, no
matter how "random," "fortuitous" or "attenuated" the defendant's contacts are with the forum.

The approach suggested by

appellants is unfounded in the law and should be rejected here.
2.

The Letter Sent To Mansour's Counsel By Masakazu
Hirota, President Of Hirota Tekko, Was Not An Answer
To The Third-Party Complaint And Therefore Did Not
Waive Hirota*s Defense Of Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction.

On or about August 26, 1985, Masakazu Hirota, President of
Hirota Tekko, sent two letters to Mansour's counsel, one
written in Japanese and one written in English.
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The letter

written in English, which is apparently a translation of the
letter written in Japanese, reads as follows:
Second District Court
In & For Davis County,
State of Utah,
Farmington
Utah 84025 USA
1985, 26 of August
We haven't any responsibility about this matter,
Civil No. 33206.
Masakazu Hirota
President of Hirota Tekko, K.K.
4805 Kako
Inamicho, Kakogun
Hyogo, Japan
(Signature of Mr. Hirota in
Japanese)
If there is any difference between the two, Japanese
sentence and English sentence, in any case, Japanese
sentence is right.
On September 9, 1986, Mansour's attorney sent Mr. Hirota's
letters to the trial court clerk for filing.

R. 428.

Although

nowhere on either of Mr. Hirota's letters is it stated that the
letters are an answer to the third-party complaint, Mansour has
subsequently determined to refer to Mr. Hirota's letters as an
"answer" or "pro se answer."

See, Brief of Appellant, pp. 1 &

5.
In view of this court's decision in Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005
(1970), appellants* contention that the letters Mr. Hirota sent
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to Mansour's counsel constitute an answer to the third-party
complaint is without merit.

In the Fibreboard case, the

plaintiff claimed that a letter the defendant wrote to the
plaintiff's attorney, who then filed the letter with the clerk
of the court, constituted an answer and a general appearance on
behalf of the defendant.

475 P.2d at 1006.

The letter reads

as follows:
Dear Sirs:
This is in answer to complaint civil No. 184947.
First:

You claim that we are residents of Salt Lake
County or have property in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
Answer: We moved to Pacifies, Calif, on
March 8, 1965 and have been residents of
Calif, since and we have never had property in
Salt Lake County.

Second:

Mr. Knowlton, I once told you that this bill
was not mine. And that the person responsible
has used or signed my name, 'whichever the
case.'

Remarks:

Last February, 1969, you had a wage attachment
against me. I have suffered embrassment
[sic], my job was jeopardized, and other
personal effects.

Now:

I had to hire an attorny [sic] to get my money
that was held for this attachment. The same
Civil No. 184947.
Please let me know if you are going to
pursue this matter, 'if so,' I will let my
attorny [sic] handle it. My compensation for
this matter may be expensive.
Ronald W. Dietrich

Id. at 1007, nt. 1.
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The court held that the letter did not constitute a general
appearance, stating simply:

"The claim of the plaintiff that

the defendant Ronald W. Dietrich made a general appearance by
the filing of his letter above referred to is without merit."
Id. at 1006. An answer is always an appearance.

Rio Del Mar

Country Club v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. App. 2d 214, 190 P.2d
295, 300 (1948), 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appearance § 16 (1962).

Hence,

in Fibreboard, by finding that defendant Dietrich's letter was
not a general appearance, this court necessarily determined
that the letter was not an answer.

Hirota Tekko's letter is

not even styled as an answer, as was the Dietrich letter.
Therefore, under the Fibreboard case, this court should find
Hirota's letter neither to be an answer nor a general appearance.
It is significant that Mr. Hirota did not send his letter
to the court, but merely sent it to Mansour's counsel.

It

would be patently unfair for this court to deem the filing of
the letter by Mansour's counsel to be a general appearance and
waiver of the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by
Hirota.

Generally speaking, an appearance is an overt act by

which a party comes into court and submits himself to its
jurisdiction.

5 Am. Jur. 2d Appearance § 1 (1962); 6 C.J.S.

Appearances § 2 (1975); see also Sharp v. Sharp, 196 Kan. 38,
409 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Kan. 1966).
put itself before the court.

Hirota took no such action to

Mansour's counsel should not be
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found to have acted vicariously on Hirota Tekko's behalf to
bring Hirota Tekko before the court.
Additionally, the court below found that both Okada and
Hirota were served between August 2 and August 10, 1985.
R. 393.

The court also found that counsel for each of the

defendants requested and received an extension until January of
1986 in which to file pleadings, which they did.

R. 393.

Mansour cannot consistently, on one hand, grant Hirota an
extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading,
and then, on the other hand, assert that Mr. Hirota's letters
constitute an answer to Mansour1s third-party complaint.
Although Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states
that "a party waives all defenses and objections which he does
not present either by motion . . . or, . . .

in his answer or

reply," it would be fundamentally unfair and denial of due
process to apply that rule to the circumstances of this case
and hold that Hirota has waived its right to contest personal
jurisdiction.

A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a

known right.

To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing

right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and
an intention to relinquish it.

It must be distinctly made,

although it may be express or implied.

American Savings & Loan

Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968).
Here, Hirota's president, a Japanese citizen, who speaks
English as a second language, and who likely has no
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understanding of the American legal system, sent a one-sentence
letter to Mansour's counsel denying all responsibility for the
matter complained of.

Certainly such action cannot be viewed

as a knowing relinquishment of all possible defenses to the
action against Hirota.

The court should find, in accordance

with the Fibreboard case, that the Hirota letter was neither an
answer nor a waiver.
CONCLUSION
Because Hirota Tekko does not have sufficient minimum
contacts with the State of Utah, it would be offensive to
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" to
hale Hirota Tekko into Utah courts under the circumstances of
this case.

Also, Hirota Tekko did not waive the defense of

lack of personal jurisdiction by sending letters to Mansour's
counsel, which letters denied responsibility for the alleged
injuries in the instant case.

Therefore, respondent Hirota

Tekko respectfully requests this court to affirm the district
court's dismissal of the third-party complaint against Hirota
Tekko.
DATED this l*]iW day of November, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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RyaW E. Tibbi
Attorneys for Hirota Tekko
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